VIETNAM
Vietnam faces tough inflation fight
However, medium term prospects are good if govt measures to restore macroeconomic stability work, says OMKAR SHRESTHA
AFTER almost two decades of successful development, Vietnam's economy is being ravaged by inflation and macroeconomic instability as never before. How did this happen and what remedies are available to deal with it?
Pausing for a break: Vietnam has stopped pursuing growth in favour of macroeconomic stability as the CPI reached a record 26 per cent in June The country's successes are well documented. Vietnam's sizzling growth over the past 15 years has brought its poverty rate down from 58 per cent in 1993 to around 15 per cent last year. Thanks to political stability and prudent macroeconomic management, it has also managed to lure foreign investors. Foreign direct investment (FDI) approvals have increased impressively over recent years reaching US$20.3 billion last year.
However, the recent surge in inflation to double digit levels over the past several months - and still rising - could unsettle foreign investors and threaten the development gains made to date if not contained. Thus for Vietnam, the choice is clear: it should restore macroeconomic stability rather than try to pursue high growth.
While many countries in the region are also experiencing high inflation rates, the increase has been abnormally high in the case of Vietnam. The year-on-year (YOY) consumer price index (CPI) reached a record 26 per cent last month. This is mainly due to the rapid rise in food prices, but even core inflation (which excludes food and fuel) is estimated to have increased 15 per cent. While the CPI had started hitting double digit levels in the last quarter of last year, it showed sharp acceleration in the second quarter of this year.
Some of the causes of Vietnam's high inflation are externally-induced, but others are home-made. For an open economy like Vietnam, the dramatic increases in the international prices of food, fuel and construction materials have a large impact on domestic prices. For instance, the export price of Vietnamese rice more than doubled within just three months, to around US$700 per tonne in March this year. This helped to push domestic rice prices upwards as well. Food prices were also adversely affected by a severe winter, avian flu and livestock diseases. Food inflation quickly permeated into non-food areas as well. The prices of housing and construction materials increased as demand for houses, industrial and commercial complexes remained strong as a result of high rates of investment and growth.
Vietnam's exchange rate system, which is a de facto peg to the US dollar (within a narrow band), compounded the inflationary problem. Preserving the country's export competitiveness required that the booming foreign investment inflows last year be sterilised to prevent dong appreciation. Accordingly, the central bank - State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) - purchased large amounts of foreign currency from the banking system. The move, however, was not enough to fully sterilise the liquidity inflows to the economy, leading to a large monetary expansion. The excess liquidity in the system combined with the rapid expansion of the joint stock banks, resulting in a sharp acceleration in domestic credit (by 54 per cent last year compared to 29 per cent in 2006) mostly to the real estate and securities sectors. Such a pace of credit expansion compromised banks' loan appraisal procedures as well as their credit quality.
Home-made inflation
Thus, the unsterilised liquidity inflows, the unusually high domestic credit growth, expansionary fiscal policy, and aggressive public investment were the principal home-made causes of Vietnam's high inflation.
The signs of overheating of the economy are evident in infrastructure bottlenecks (such as severe electricity shortage and congested roads and ports), a tight labour market - with skilled and semi-skilled labour supply falling far behind demand - and a sharp widening of the trade and current account deficit. The trade deficit in the first half of this year (around US$15 billion) was already higher than for the whole of last year (US$12 billion), while the current account deficit is running at an alarming level of around 10 per cent of GDP.
Little surprise therefore that the non-deliverable forward rate of the dong in offshore markets is considerably more depreciated than the official spot rate, indicating that the dong is under heavy downward pressure. As people hedge against high inflation, there are indications of liquidity being converted into gold.
Under such circumstances, curbing inflation, restoring macroeconomic stability and engineering a soft landing of the economy have become the most important tasks facing Vietnam's government.
Government response
Appropriately, the government in February/March 2008, switched its priority from pursuing high growth to macroeconomic stability with a downward adjustment of growth target from 8.5-9 per cent to 7 per cent for this year. The government also announced its plan to pursue tight monetary and fiscal policies, cutting back government expenditures and public investment projects with a view to reducing trade deficits.
The prime interest rate has been raised thrice to reach 14 per cent on 11 June. The credit growth ceiling for the commercial banks has been set at below 30 per cent for the year and their credit for real estate and stocks has been restricted to 3 per cent of their total loans outstanding.
The reserve requirement ratio (the proportion of deposits that banks hold in the form of cash reserves) has been increased significantly from 5 per cent to 12 per cent effective from 27 June. The commercial banks have been required to purchase SBV bills worth about US$1.3 billion in a move to mop up cash from the banking system.
By way of maintaining exchange rate flexibility, the daily US dollar/dong trading band has been widened from +/- one per cent to +/- 2 per cent from the prevailing official rate.
Administratively, the price freeze on several essential goods and services have been extended to the end of the year.
Thanks to all these measures, there have been some signs of inflation easing. The credit controls and cut in investment projects have also brought imports down, helping to reduce the trade deficit from nearly US$3 billion in May to US$1.3 billion last month.
But concerns remain about whether these measures will be adequate to bring inflation to a manageable level. For instance, sales of SBV bills have been insufficient to slow down credit growth. There may therefore be a need for further interest rate hikes.
Considering that the pegged exchange rate has limited the SBV's degree of monetary management, a greater degree of exchange rate flexibility (with due consideration for export competitiveness) could be an option to improve the effectiveness of monetary policy and neutralise the inflationary impact of capital inflows. On the fiscal side, more cuts in public investment projects (on top of those already announced) may be needed. Off-budget investment projects also need to be reined in. And portfolio capital flows and interbank transactions may need to be closely monitored through strong coordination and information sharing among the Ministry of Finance, the SBV and other critical agencies.
Good medium term prospects
Exposure to global markets has inevitably complicated Vietnam's macroeconomic management. Notwithstanding the tightened monetary and fiscal policies, its inflation rate this year is expected to remain high. While it may slow down next year, it will still be at double-digit levels. Thus Vietnam's immediate economic outlook is volatile.
However, healthy FDI inflows during the first quarter of this year and unabated inflows of remittances (expected at around US$8 billion this year) are signs that investors are giving the government's anti-inflationary policies the thumbs up. If these policies are strongly enforced, and demand pressures and the inflation brought under control, Vietnam's prospects for sustained growth in the medium term will remain good.
The author is visiting senior research fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. The views in this article are his personal observations.